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CHAPTER 2
ABSTRACT
Everywhere in Europe, governments are struggling to meet the competing goals of an efficient, equitable and
affordable healthcare system. In this paper, we analyze the evolution of cost containment policies in Dutch
healthcare. Compared to other Bismarckian social health insurance countries, the Netherlands has been rela-
tively successful in cost containment policies. But from the mid 1990s onwards, Dutch healthcare has been
radically reformed. The former bifurcated health insurance system has been transformed into a national health
insurance together with the introduction of competition between health insurers and healthcare providers.
Given that uncontrolled total healthcare cost inflation may eventually erode universal access to basic health
services; we argue that cost containment measures cannot be relaxed. But the recent reforms in Dutch health-
care, including the introduction of a regulated market, have important consequences for the feasibility of effec-
tive and legitimate cost containment policies in Dutch healthcare.
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INTRODUCTION
Each year, the Netherlands spends between 9.2 and 13.5 percent of its GDP on healthcare, depending on what
we choose to include under such care. Healthcare also accounts for an increasingly large share of economic
growth (currently, 20 percent), as well as for the increase in taxes and premiums, with almost 35 percent spent
on healthcare. Moreover, virtually every year, healthcare expenditures exceed the budget agreed to in the coali-
tion agreements signed by most recent Dutch governments, with the gap tending to increase over the course of
the government’s term in office. The government itself has insufficient control over this process, and political
parties only have limited insight into how funds allocated for healthcare are spent.
Cost containment is not the most popular element of any health policy program, since it will inevitably cre-
ate scarcity in available resources and services. Excessive cost containment strategies will even have adverse
effects on the amount of equity and efficiency in healthcare. There are additional factors that must be taken
into account when assessing the problem of public expenditures on healthcare, such as the critical threshold of
social willingness-to-pay, economic growth and the danger of inflation, standard levels of care, an adequate
level of improved health (do we get value for money) and international agreements such as the EMU budget
criteria that the Netherlands has agreed on (RVZ, 2008). Hence, from a policy perspective, the institutional de-
sign of a healthcare system and the instruments needed to contain public expenditures on healthcare without vi-
olating other health policy goals is extremely complex. 
In this paper, we argue that cost containment measures cannot be isolated from questions concerning equity
and efficiency in healthcare, nor can they be isolated from the overarching institutional configuration of the
health care policy system. We start our analysis by focusing on the necessity of cost containment in healthcare
and the need to assess the effectiveness of cost containment measures in relation to other elements of health-
care policy. In our empirical analysis of the evolution of cost containment policies in the Netherlands, we relate
the evolution of these policy measures to the evolving institutional configuration of Dutch healthcare. From the
late 1980s, successive Dutch cabinets have worked on the development of a system of regulated competition,
together with a statutory (national) health insurance in which the different schemes of private insurers and sick-
ness funds would have to converge into one basic package. Given the fact that the market in healthcare is
plagued by severe market-failures, we ask the consequences of regulated competition are for cost containment
strategies? We end this paper with the conclusion that there still is an incentive problem in Dutch healthcare
when it comes to sustainable cost containment strategies
THE PATHOLOGY OF HEALTHCARE POLICY
More than in any other area of the welfare state, altruistic concerns (the role of giving) play an integral role in
healthcare in the sense that it is generally acknowledged that healthcare should be excluded from economic
calculus arguments. Nevertheless, as Nicholas Barr explains, although we conceive of these altruistic argu-
ments in healthcare often as morally superior to the economic calculus argument, we should beware of exces-
sive reliance on altruism. In contrast to, for example, the donation of blood (Titmuss’s famous case), the
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marginal social cost of healthcare is not only positive, but also large (Barr, 1998). Time spent with one patient
cannot be spent with other patients, and the (public) resources devoted to healthcare come at the expense of
other areas. Hence, whether we like it or not, given the scarcity of public resources and the ongoing increase of
demand for healthcare, altruism would run healthcare into serious allocation problems. In ‘Speaking Truth to
Power’, Wildavsky once argued that the ‘pathology’ of healthcare policy is that the past successes of medicine
are likely to lead to future failures in healthcare policy. For, as life expectancy increases, only partly as the re-
sult of medicine, a nation’s healthcare system is faced with an older population whose ailments are more diffi-
cult to treat, sending the costs of treatment ever higher while each improvement in health and medicine
becomes more expensive than the last. In the end, this will undermine solidarity, since, again in the words of
Wildavsky: ‘the rich don’t like waiting, the poor don’t like high prices, and those in the middle tend to com-
plain about both.’ (Wildavsky, 1979: 285). Without any control over the public expenditures on healthcare, the
solidarity so triumphal achieved in nearly all western healthcare systems, will inevitability get exhausted. 
Until the end the 1960s, governments were mainly concerned with promoting equal access on the basis of
equal needs. The issue of universal coverage and the enactment of national health insurance have led to long
during conflicts between medical practitioners, insurers, employers, employees and the government. Once these
conflicts had been largely settled – by the second half of the twentieth century – two dominant healthcare sys-
tems could be discerned in the post-war welfare state; a tax-funded National Health Service (Beveridge-system)
and a Bismarckian social insurance system, often complemented with private health insurance (Korpi, 1989; Im-
mergut, 1992; Blake and Adolino, 2001). Today, with the important exception of the United States, healthcare
has attained the status of a universal social program in almost all welfare states. But the equity-efficiency bal-
ance, the classic trade-off in the economics of the welfare state, has been thrown into conflict by the fundamen-
tals of the medical care market itself (Cutler, 2002). During the post-war period of welfare state expansion,
expenditure on healthcare increased rapidly, partly because technological innovations were expanding both the
capability of, and demand for, medical treatment.1 It is against the background of the economic crises of the
1970s that governments became more and more concerned with cost containment by means of rationing health-
care services and controlling access to healthcare. It turned out that some countries were better cost-controllers
than others and to a large extent; this could be attributed to the institutional design of their healthcare systems. 
Both economic theory and empirical evidence support the view that a purely private market for medical
care and medical insurance will not only be highly inequitable, but also very costly (Arrow, 1963; Mossialos
and Le Grand, 1999; Hacker, 2002). It is in this respect important that the United States, the only OECD coun-
try that has not yet established universal health insurance coverage, spends on average 30 percent more on
healthcare than the other OECD countries (Cutler, 2002; Hacker, 2002). OECD health data (OECD, 2007) for
example, demonstrate the continuing success of Canada as compared with the US to control total costs. The
vital difference between the US and Canada was that Canada introduced of universal coverage from the early
1970s, hospital services became free at the point of delivery, while the US continued with incomplete coverage
and high user charges. The outcomes were, in Canada, not just greater equity of access to hospitals but also
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that the Canadian government had discovered the potential of a single payer system for more effective cost
control than the US (Bevan et al, 2010). During the fiscal crises of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the model in
which government acted as insurer in a single payer system offered the attraction of a capacity to contain total
costs of healthcare. At least until the early 2000s, the UK was in this respect an exemplar of the effectiveness
of a single payer system in controlling total healthcare costs too much (Bevan, at al, 2010). In the family of so-
cial health insurance countries, the Netherlands has been quite successful in containing public expenditures on
healthcare, but this was mainly achieved by combining a corporatist system with a manifold of supply side in-
terventions from the state (Helderman, et al, 2005). Cost containment may be better served by a state-con-
trolled system than in corporatist social health insurance systems or competitive market systems.
While governments were indeed able to limit the growth of their healthcare budgets to some extent, by the
1990s, skepticism increased about the consequences of supply-side regulation in healthcare. The ageing of the
population, technological progress and economic growth continued to raise public expectations and, conse-
quently, public expenditures on healthcare, while cuts in healthcare spending by means of expenditure caps and
supply-side and demand-side rationing were provoking strong opposition. What is more, the instruments being
used to contain costs in healthcare (expenditure caps and supply rationing policies) were adversely affecting
the efficient allocations of resources in healthcare provisions. Having achieved a high degree of solidarity in
terms of both vertical and horizontal equity, governments still had to found answers on the question of how to
control the public expenditures on healthcare while at the same time, allocating resources as efficient as possi-
ble. This, in turn, created a window for a third generation of reforms in which some countries, including the
Netherlands, looked for market-oriented solutions in order to contain overall healthcare expenditure while at
the same time enhancing the efficiency in healthcare delivery (Cutler, 2002). Well-functioning markets are gen-
erally good in stimulating innovation and efficiency. And although the medical market is plagued by virtually
all the basic market failures that one can think of, it is no surprise that in order to stimulate a more efficient
healthcare system, governments started to rediscover the possible benefits of the market.
Incorporating the ideas of the American Health Economist Alain Enthoven’s (Enthoven, 1978, 1993) about
‘managed competition’, competition in healthcare was being introduced as an alternative to regulatory limits
on healthcare costs and implicit or explicit rationing policies. In the UK, the introduction of the quasi market
was promoted in the early 1990s with reference to the need of making welfare providers more responsive to the
needs and wants of users of welfare, but without distorting the solidarity fundaments and cement of social pol-
icy programs. Competition and economic incentives were added to the repertoire of governance arrangements
and were thought to be complementary to the existing system of command-and-control in which healthcare
costs were successfully contained. In a similar vein, regulated competition has been introduced in Dutch
healthcare together with a national health insurance, providing a basic package for all citizens, in order to en-
hance the efficiency of healthcare provision. Yet, the introduction of market-type incentives in the form of an
internal market or regulated competition in a system of universal coverage is likely to alter the entire configu-
ration of a healthcare system (Helderman, 2007).
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In the remaining sections of this paper, we concentrate our analysis on the Netherlands. We describe and
analyze the evolution of cost containment policies in relation to the evolving institutional configuration of the
Dutch healthcare system. We first describe the introduction and evolution of cost containment in the Dutch cor-
poratist healthcare system. This is followed by a description of the market-oriented reforms in Dutch health-
care in the 1990s. We then analyze the consequences of this new institutional configuration for cost
containment strategies.
COST CONTAINMENT IN A CORPORATIST HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
Dutch healthcare is based on the two constituting principles of the Dutch welfare state. First, the principle of
'subsidiarity' implies that what can be delivered in the private sphere should not be undertaken by government.
Hence, although the Dutch state has major constitutional responsibilities for the efficiency, accessibility and
quality of healthcare, it is not equipped to accomplish these responsibilities under its own strength but always
dependent on the willingness and capacity of private non-profit actors to cooperate. The second principle is
that of solidarity on an organized basis, actively supported by the government. The combined result was a cor-
poratist structured healthcare system with predominantly public financing and private delivery of healthcare in
which national associations of healthcare providers, insurers, trade unions, and employers play and important
intermediary role (Helderman, 2007).
The insurance arrangements in the Dutch healthcare system display the classic characteristics of the corpo-
ratist Bismarckian welfare state. The Sickness Fund Decree (Ziekenfondsbesluit) enacted in 1941, introduced
mandatory sickness fund participation, an income-related contribution to be paid by employees (50 percent)
and employers (50 percent), and a broad coverage of services, including hospital care, uniform rules and state
control for all funds (Van der Hoeven, 1983; Okma, 1997). In the years that followed, compulsory insurance
was gradually extended to cover both new types of benefits and new groups of non-employees. The insurance
system was more or less completed with the enactment of The Exceptional Medical Expenses Act (AWBZ) in
1967. The AWBZ covers the risks of long-term care and mental health care. Originally, it was developed in
order to insure the population against those health-related risks that could not be covered by an actuarial health
insurance scheme. In the course of its operation, however, the AWBZ scheme was considerably expanded. As
long as private health insurers were able and willing to deliver around the same level of social protection as the
sickness fund scheme, the bifurcated system could be viewed as being de facto a universal system of health in-
surance. Nevertheless, compared to other Bismarckian SHI countries, the income threshold for social health in-
surance was relatively low. Nearly 30 percent of the Dutch population had to insure themselves privately, as
opposed to 10 percent in Germany.2
Immediately after the war, the reconstruction of the industrial infrastructure meant that government control of
hospital fees and capacity was imperative (Schut, 1995: 54). By means of the Reconstruction Act of 1947, the
government could determine the total budget for hospital construction whereas hospital fees were regulated on the
basis of the general price regulation of 1939, which had also been the basis for rent regulation in the social rental
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sector. Until 1965, hospital per diem rates were based on guidelines from the Ministry of Economic Affairs; sick-
ness funds and private health insurers were not involved in the determination of hospital prices. The reimburse-
ment levels of physicians and general practitioners, by contrast, were set by means of periodical negotiations
between the associations of sickness funds and physicians. It was not until the 1960s that government control over
hospital rates and hospital capacity could be liberalized. But the combination of economic growth and a laissez-
faire corporatist policy style resulted immediately in an expansion of hospital and healthcare expenditure.
The first attempts at cost containment were aimed at constraining the discretionary freedom of the various
corporatist arrangements and governing boards in Dutch healthcare. In 1965, the Hospital Prices Act (WTZ)
was adopted, under which hospital price setting was to be determined by a process of negotiation between the
sickness funds and hospitals, and approved by the Central Office on Hospital Prices (COZ), which consisted of
the representatives of sickness funds, hospitals and a number of independent experts. But because sickness
funds had neither expertise in negotiating prices nor any incentive to control hospital costs, and the govern-
ment lacked any instruments to control hospital capacity, the COZ was largely dominated by the hospitals that
had no interest in containing the costs of their provisions. Hospital costs escalated by more than 20 percent a
year and healthcare expenditure increased from about 4 percent of GNP at the beginning of the 1960s to about
7 percent in the early 1970s (Schut, 1995; Helderman, 2007).
In the 1970s, the COZ and its successor, the COTG, had already undergone a gradual transformation from
a corporatist – self-governing – organization that was dependent on negotiated agreements, towards a more
quasi-governmental organization. Consultations between the COZ and the government were intensified at the
cost of the dominant position of hospitals and the government’s budgetary constraints increasingly influenced
the formulation of guidelines for determining hospital rates. However, it turned out that the government’s right
to give binding instructions to the COTG was very limited. The increasing necessity for cost containment in
the 1970s and 1980s, therefore, caused governments of varying political coalitions to a more radical shift in
their orientation from laissez-faire corporatism towards an etatist style of supply side regulation (Schut, 1995).3
In 1982, the first centre-right Cabinet of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers took office. The new Cabinet took a
fundamentally different direction in socio-economic policy making and adherent policy areas such as health-
care. For its budgetary policy program, it adopted an austere policy style which meant the government’s global
budget simply could not be exceeded. Most important and effective in terms of controlling healthcare spend-
ing, were several ad hoc interventions during the 1980s which put an end to the open-ended financing of hospi-
tals and other healthcare institutions and enforced a reduction of excess hospital capacity. It is mainly because
of these interventionist ad hoc measures that the government indeed succeeded in gaining substantial control
over healthcare expenditure, as a result of which the proportion of GDP spent on health services has remained
stable at around 8.5 percent since the 1980s (OECD, 2007). But these etatist measures, which were different
for each echelon of the healthcare system, not only led to continuous conflicts between the government and
healthcare providers, but also seriously undermined the efficiency of the Dutch healthcare system. In the
1980s, doubts about the effectiveness of these various etatist interventions increased. Yet, healthcare could not
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as simply be liberalized as other policy areas in the welfare state. Healthcare was not immune to the more gen-
eralized discontent with state intervention as a means of governance, which resulted from the dismissal of Key-
nesian macro-economic policy making; however, neither could healthcare be made to work without any
governmental controls on healthcare expenditures. More fundamental reforms were needed to restore the effi-
ciency-equity tradeoff in Dutch healthcare.
BRINGING THE MARKET BACK IN: REGULATED COMPETITION
It is against this background that, from the late 1980s, successive Dutch cabinets have worked on the develop-
ment and implementation of a system of regulated competition, together with a national health insurance in which
the different schemes of private insurers and sickness funds would converge into one basic package. In 1986, the
center-right government of Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers installed the Dekker Committee. The Dekker Commit-
tee was based on independent expertise rather than corporatist representation of health insurers, hospital, physi-
cians and social partners (Helderman, 2007). The committee was explicitly asked to build its recommendations on
Enthoven’s model of ‘managed competition’ and it took the Committee just seven months to come up with unani-
mous recommendations. In March 1987, it published its report under the significant title ‘Willingness to Change’
in which it proposed replacing all separate healthcare financing schemes with a comprehensive mandatory na-
tional health insurance scheme, provided by both the sickness funds and the private (for-profit) health insurers. In
order to encourage health insurers and providers to become more efficient, it proposed a regulated competitive en-
vironment for health insurers and providers. In this way, it aimed to incorporate the market within a universal sys-
tem in order to enhance efficiency in the health insurance market and the healthcare provision market.
Given this mixture of social and market elements, the Dekker Plan was a politically ingenious plan, as evi-
denced by its survival, relatively unchanged, from the transition from center-right government to center-left
government in 1989. The official White Paper became known as the Simons Plan, named after the new Social
Democratic Secretary of State for Health, Hans Simons. Simons wanted to realize the national health insurance
scheme by means of a gradual expansion of the prevailing (tax-funded) Exceptional Medical Expenses scheme
(AWBZ). Gradually all the benefits covered by both insurance schemes would then be brought under the scope
of the AWBZ. It should be emphasized at this point that Simons had in fact little choice. Many of the necessary
instruments that are needed for a universal but competitive health insurance system, such as a more sophisti-
cated and better-developed risk-equalization scheme, were simply not available at that time. Next to this, there
turned out to be political controversies between the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats about the
scope of coverage proposed by Simons. In the Simons Plan, the national basic insurance scheme would cover
95 percent (instead of the 85 percent that was proposed by the Dekker committee) of the total expenditure on
healthcare and social services. In addition, the economic recession at the beginning of the nineties made em-
ployers and the Ministry of Finance increasingly wary of the introduction of competition and choice, fearing
that this would result in uncontrollable cost inflation (Helderman et al, 2005). In 1993, the Christian Democrats
therefore effectively blocked any further approval of the Simons plan and in 1994 a disillusioned Simons re-
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signed just before the fall of the center-left Cabinet.
But what the Dekker-Plan had accomplished was that it had initiated the development of a new set of policy
ideas in healthcare. In the early 1990s, these new ideas about how to incorporate competition and choice in a so-
cial health insurance system began to inform institutional adjustments of the healthcare system, and as a conse-
quence, the incentive structure for both health insurers and healthcare providers gradually changed. A revision of
the Sickness Fund Act in 1992, for example, made it possible for sickness funds to selectively contract with
healthcare professionals and to compete for enrollees. In 1993 the system of retrospective reimbursement of
sickness funds was replaced by prospective risk-adjusted capitation payments, so that the sickness funds began
to bare some of the risk for the medical expenses of their enrollees. The change in the reimbursement system
was accompanied by the introduction of choice in the health insurance market. In 1992, sickness funds were re-
quired to have open enrollment periods, during which enrollees were free to switch between sickness funds, irre-
spective of their health status. To enable price competition, finally, sickness funds were permitted to charge a flat
rate (community-rated) premium to their enrollees in addition to the income-related contribution. As a result of
these incremental adjustments of the incentive-structure, health insurers and healthcare providers began to ‘culti-
vate’ the market from within the path dependent boundaries of the Dutch healthcare system.
After the fall of the center-left Cabinet in 1994, the ‘purple’ coalition took office. The color purple reflected
the novel coalition of left (red) and right (blue) political parties, excluding the Christian Democrats from govern-
ment for the first time since 1917. The new Social Liberal Minister of Health, Els Borst, took office under tough
budgetary constraints in order to combat high unemployment figures and an economic recession. The 1995
healthcare programme “Cost containment in the healthcare sector” reflected the budgetary priorities within
healthcare. Learning from the demise of the Simons Plan, Minister Borst stressed that she was in favor of incre-
mental changes rather than comprehensive blue prints. Nevertheless, as in the early 1990s, the two Purple Cabi-
nets never abandoned the market-oriented program. The gradual improvement of the risk-adjustment
equalization scheme in the second half of the 1990s, made it possible to give the sickness funds more liability
for the medical expenses of their enrollees. Consequently, the financial incentives for sickness funds to act as a
prudent purchaser of health services increased substantially (Helderman, et al, 2005). By allowing individual
providers and insurers more autonomy in exchange for larger risk bearing, the locus of power in Dutch health-
care shifted from the national associations of insurers and providers towards individual healthcare providers and
health insurers. At the same time, many of the necessary instrumental and institutional preconditions for a na-
tional health insurance scheme were gradually realized and implemented. In January 2000, the Sickness Fund
Council that administered the sickness fund scheme was converted into the Healthcare Insurance Board (CVZ)
which became responsible for the administration of the Central Health Insurance Fund from which risk-equal-
ization subsidies are paid to the health insurers. All these gradual transformations paved the way for a national
health insurance system in combination with competitive relations between health insurers and providers.
It was only at the end of its second term in office, in 2001 that the Cabinet dared to speak again in terms of
comprehensive healthcare reforms. In its justification for a new health insurance system, the Cabinet explicitly
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mentioned the threat of the diminishing solidarity of the old system which could not longer be tackled with ad
hoc corrective measures (Ministry of Health, 2001: 17). But having learned from the failure of the Simons Plan,
the government now proposed a different transition path. Rather than using the AWBZ as a vehicle for reforms,
reforms should start with the integration of the sickness fund scheme and private health insurance into a national
insurance scheme for curative healthcare services The new scheme would have to be modeled on the sickness
fund scheme where the conditions for regulated competition were largely fulfilled. As in the early 1990s, there
were still a number of ideological obstacles on which the social democrats and the liberals were unable to reach
compromises. The coalition parties strongly disagreed about the method of premium-setting within a national in-
surance scheme. The Social Democrats adhered to a largely income-related contribution and a relatively small
flat rate premium, as already existed in the sickness fund scheme. The Liberals, meanwhile, were in favor of a
fully community-rated premium with tax compensation in the form of individual healthcare allowances for in-
come effects. As well as this classical issue, the Liberals and Social Democrats quarreled about how equitable
the new health insurance scheme should be and whether it should be a competitive 'social' health insurance
scheme or a regulated 'private' health insurance scheme. Reaching the end of its term, the Cabinet decided to
postpone the actual enactment of the reform proposals after the general elections of 2002. 
The (three) centre-right coalition Cabinets that succeeded the Purple coalition were in a much better politi-
cal position to enforce a breakthrough in the reforms. With the Social Democrats in opposition, the Cabinet
could freely choose for a nominal premium that would cover 50 percent of the costs and implement and indi-
vidual healthcare allowance to compensate the lower incomes. The new Minister of Health in the second
Balkenende Cabinet, the Liberal Hans Hoogervorst, set up an ambitious program of legislation in order to pre-
pare the final enactment of the new Health Insurance Act, in which he quite deliberately built on the founda-
tions laid by his predecessor in the previous coalitions. With the enactment of the new health insurance act on
January 1st, 2006, the bifurcated insurance system was finally been converted into one mandatory national
health insurance scheme, guaranteeing universal access to basic healthcare services and provided by both the
former sickness funds and the private health insurers. For this purpose, the Netherlands has developed one of
the most sophisticated risk-equalization schemes, which is a necessary condition for providing universal cover-
age of the basic package by private for-profit and non–profit health insurers (Van de Ven, et al, 2003). Mean-
while, regulated competition had been gradually implemented in the years preceding the formal reforms.
Competition now is strategically located in the health insurance market and the healthcare provision market.
The competitive trick in the new national health insurance system is that the risk-adjusted capitation payments
from the Central Fund do not cover all individual expected costs and that health insurers are permitted to re-
cover residual expenses by charging a community-rated premium. Hence, if health insurers are able to manage
healthcare more efficiently than their competitors, they can make more profit or charge a lower premium and
thus attract more enrollees. Switching health insurers (choice) has been made possible by mandatory open en-
rollment periods on an annual base, during which enrollees are free to choose another health insurer at its pre-
vailing community-rated premium.
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COST CONTAINMENT IN A REGULATED COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT
The current Dutch model, in which universal coverage is guaranteed within a competitive health insurance and
healthcare provision market, certainly is among the most revolutionary systems in the world. Ironically, the ini-
tial ideas for a system of regulated competition were imported from the United States while at this time, as well
as in the mid-1990s during the Clinton healthcare reforms, the Dutch model attracts interest not only from its
neighboring SHI-countries, but from the United States as well (Enthoven and Van de Ven, 2007).4 But does
regulated competition also provide solutions for the problem of cost containment? Healthcare expenditures are
paid by the aggregate sum of premium payers (i.e. employers and individuals) and taxpayers (government con-
tributions), but this is not the same as being able to control the expenses made in healthcare. How sustainable
in terms of cost containment is this newly created healthcare system? Our preliminary answer to this question
is that it is hardly more sustainable than the old system since it does not address the question of cost control
consequentially enough. Although the new healthcare system is still in an experimental stage of its develop-
ment, lessons can be learned from the practice of cost containment that has developed from 1995 when succes-
sive Dutch Cabinets have worked with multi-year global budgets for healthcare, the so-called Budgetary
Framework for Healthcare (BKZ).
Table 1 shows the overruns that have since then occurred in relation to the expenses specified in the vari-
ous Government Agreements. It emerges that actual expenditure has been consistently higher than was agreed
under the Government Agreement and this gap increases as the government term progresses. The fact that suc-
cessive governments have allocated increasingly more funds towards healthcare has not affected this process in
any significant way. In fact, the contrary is true: the overruns only appear to have grown. The fact that the size
of the public health expenditures as a percentage of GDP has remained just above the nine percent is also mis-
leading in this respect since part of it can be contributed to the high economic growth achieved in most of this
period. The most significant strategy that helped to contain the macro-costs in healthcare was transferring ben-
efits from the basic health insurance packages to the additional insurance packages (e.g. physiotherapy and
dental care) and certain ‘technical’ changes and window dressing that had an optical diminishing effect (mainly
shifts to the governmental budget): including funds for university clinics, public health. In practice, the Budg-
etary Framework for Healthcare has turned out to be a calculation-unit that was strongly subject to downward
definition change.5 Although in some cases, the budget was exceeded deliberately in order to facilitate new
policies, most budget overruns were caused by the fact that providers and medical professionals delivered more
than was agreed. Moreover, as these overruns often manifested themselves too late, it was not always possible
to redress them. Although the government occasionally has tried to redress the budget overruns by means of hi-
erarchically imposed or negotiated efficiency deductions, more often, overruns have simply been taken for
granted and dealt with by raising the global budget for healthcare.6
To conclude the budget model has run into troubles due to the increasing lack of cost compliance and due
to the fact that nearly any production incentives were rendered subservient to the need for cost control. Given
the fact that until now, budget overruns have been too easily accepted and compensated, there seems to be no
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real sense of urgency for taking responsibility for the global healthcare budget by other actors than the govern-
ment. Over the past several years, the global budget has been overrun virtually every year. Paradoxically, this
situation did not change when the amount of available resources increased. This indicates to problems that are
related to the institutions and incentives at work in Dutch healthcare. More specifically, the shift to more de-
centralized autonomy is currently occurring at a faster rate than the increase in financial risk, which means
more rights without the concomitant obligations. The problem of healthcare costs being not in control is to a
large extent related to the moral hazard that the current system produces. 
Professionals, patients, clients, care providers, health insurance companies, assessment bodies and health-
care administration offices all barely carry the financial risk of their actions. None of these parties has an insti-
tutional embedded self- interest in controlling expenditure. For providers, more expenditures mean higher
remuneration, higher salaries and better fringe benefits, more career opportunities, more research opportunities,
more social influence and reduced work pressure. The healthcare providers (hospitals, nursing homes) are
often supported by patients and clients, who believe that higher expenses guarantee better health. And since pa-
tients themselves do not bear any financial risk – with the exception of small out-of-pocket payments – they
will be pleased to accept additional treatments, as long as they benefit from it in some way. Insurance compa-
nies, finally, are focusing primarily on attracting new customers and on downsizing their administrative costs.
Table 1 – Global Budget and Overruns in Billions of EUR
Source: VWS-FEZ, RVZ, 2008
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Selective healthcare purchasing (managed care) and differentiation in the insurance packages are slowly get-
ting off the ground. Budgetary problems are routinely resolved at the decentralized level by means of ‘grey’
agreements between insurers and providers. Volume risks are too easily shifted to the patients, resulting in
longer waiting lists and an increase in the price-per-unit of service.
The risk borne by health insurance companies depends on a complex risk equalization scheme. If the risk
equalization system is designed in such a way that insurers receive only a standard risk-adjusted amount for
each policyholder based on aspects they cannot control, the insurance company bears full risk. This is referred
to as ‘ex-ante equalization’. However, since these risk-adjustment subsidies are still under development and do
not (yet) adjust for all the predictable losses, the model also includes a wide range of compensations for budget
results achieved – the ex-post equalization. In stark contrast to the ex-ante equalization, this reduces health in-
surers’ risk liability, and is some cases it is eliminated altogether. An insurance company that reduces its claim
levels by implementing an effective purchasing strategy, e.g. managed care would then not see this reflected in
its operating profit at all. Actors thus enjoy the benefit of liberalization without bearing the financial responsi-
bility of their strategies. Hence, what is needed is that a larger proportion of the financial risks are devolved to
the health insurers. This surely will meet a fair amount of resistance, because even though the sector is in favor
of deregulation, actors soon reconsider their support when they learn about the risks involved. Nevertheless, in-
creasing the risks devolved to health insurers together with an improved risk-adjustment scheme is probably
the most effective way to keep expenses in check in a system of managed competition. Insurers should be pro-
vided with more opportunities to control their risk portfolio, e.g. greater opportunities with respect to individu-
als covered by group insurance schemes. And secondly, insurers must be given more freedom for selective
healthcare purchasing, such as capitation fees for primary care and managed care strategies. In addition, insur-
ers must be given more opportunities to reward good quality and penalize poor quality.
In its current form, it seems fair to conclude that without additional measures, the provisions of the
global budget are likely to be continuously exceeded (RVZ, 2008). As a consequence, the healthcare system
drives the level of acceptable levels of risk solidarity to its limits. If cost containment runs out of control,
solidarity transfers are likely to increase significantly as a result of the ageing of the population and social
and cultural trends (i.e. the divorce rate, migration, unhealthy lifestyles, growing technological possibilities
and a growing demand for ‘prosperity-proof’ facilities, particularly under the Exceptional Medical Expenses
Act (AWBZ). More and more solidarity transfers will be required to continue to fund the healthcare system
in the current manner. In twenty years’ time, an average net payer will pay approximately € 3,600 (in real
terms) more for a net receiver than is currently the case, an increase of more than 100 percent. In other
words: the ‘average Joe’ (but in the Netherlands, we call him Jan) will need to pay approximately 15 percent
of his salary (€29,500 in 2006) to healthcare consumers, compared to 10 percent now. While income solidar-
ity is ‘limited’ due to low thresholds, risk solidarity is pushed to its maximum level. Employers already have
stated that they have a problem with their automatic contributions to healthcare, as this undermines their
competitive position (RVZ, 2008).
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CONCLUSIONS
From a welfare economics perspective, Kenneth Arrow once argued that the problem with healthcare is that the
social adjustment towards efficiency will always puts obstacles in its own path because of the uncertainty and
non-marketability of the bearing of risks and the imperfect marketability of information. As a consequence,
healthcare systems will always be confronted with second-best solutions in the form of compensatory institu-
tional structures (Arrow, 1963). Arrow’s point was that the medical market was in need of compensatory institu-
tional structures that not only mitigated the negative effects of the market, but that also transformed the working
of these markets in a more fundamental and equitable way. As such, Arrow’s argument provided the rationale for
compulsory insurance arrangements in healthcare. But these compulsory insurance arrangements are on their
turn vulnerable for problems of moral hazard and over-consumption. Institutions fulfill certain purposes (they
help to solve problems of collective action) but given the multiplicity and sometimes irreconcilability of policy
goals, it is more useful to think of institutions in terms of institutional configurations that define a set of interre-
lated incentives and constraints which are likely to influence the individual agent’s strategies. Any understand-
ing of the governance of modern healthcare systems, therefore, requires the study of how different institutions
and their accompanying governance arrangements and policy instruments are complementary to each other.
In the history of Dutch healthcare, three policy programs can successively be discerned in the twentieth
century: a corporatist policy program, that was particularly dominant until the 1970s, aimed at universal access
based on equal needs; an etatist policy program, that became dominant since the eighties, aimed at cost con-
tainment by means of supply side regulation; and a market-oriented program that was developed during the
1990s in response to the alleged inefficiency of healthcare provision (Helderman, et al, 2005; Helderman,
2007). Together, these three programs constitute the institutional configuration that is needed to sustain at least
to some extent the equity-efficiency balance in Dutch healthcare. 
But cost containment remains problematic. This will not be without consequences since uncontrolled public
healthcare expenditures are likely to have an adverse effect on the amount of equity that is legitimated and the
efficiency of healthcare provision. In this paper, we have explored ways in which a strategy based on controlled
expenditures within a system of regulated competition could follow the consequential logic of the competitive
market; transferring the financial risk from the central level to the decentralized level, particularly healthcare in-
surers. Essentially, market reforms are based on the devolution of 'benefits' and 'costs'. When the various parties
do not run any actual financial risk on their activities, expenditure will continue to increase and there will be no
other option than to implement major cost cuts each time. In such case, the shadow system of global budgets
cannot be dismantled much further. Cost containment cannot be the responsibility of the government alone,
since it is not always equipped to deal with all the various countervailing powers. Under the endemic conditions
of scarce collective resources for healthcare, the proliferation of technological possibilities in medical care, the
import of new pharmaceuticals and an ever increasing demand for medical services, there will be a lasting need
to contain collective expenditure on healthcare. Equal access to reflect the equal needs of all citizens is still a
key value in Dutch healthcare. But in order to maintain this key-value in the long term, cost containment is in-
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evitable. Reallocating the responsibilities in healthcare together with some of the financial risks is needed. After
all, in the capitalist welfare states, there is no such thing as a free lunch, not even in their hospitals.
ENDNOTES
1 Empirical estimates suggest that technological change accounts for at least half of overall cost growth, the re-
mainder cost growth results from increased prices of services and increased use of existing technologies be-
cause of the spread of insurance (Cutler, 2002: 887).
2 But already in the early 1980s, the Dutch system had become extremely vulnerable for solidarity undermining
rent-seeking strategies of private health insurers. Problems of risk selection escalated in the 1970s when private
health insurers started to introduce age-related premiums. In order to maintain cross-scheme equity in health-
care, the Christian Democrat / Liberal Cabinet of Prime Minister Lubbers therefore forced the private health
insurers in 1986 to institute a risk pool and to offer all applicants of this scheme a legally standardized policy,
offering comprehensive benefits at a legally determined maximum premium (known as the Access to Health
Insurance Act, WTZ). In the years that followed, the scope of this risk pool was steadily expanded by the gov-
ernment. With hindsight, the enactment of the WTZ accomplished two things in Dutch healthcare. It brought
an end to the gradual exhaustion of cross-scheme solidarity in Dutch healthcare by enforcing private health in-
surers to institute a risk pool and it paved the way for a gradual convergence between the private health insur-
ers and social health insurers.
3 The gradual transformation of this formerly corporatist organization did not stop here. In 2000, the COTG
was converted into the CTG which then in 2006 the CTG became part of the new Dutch Healthcare Authority,
which is independent from sectoral interests and an autonomous governmental organization.
4 We should, however, not be overly optimistic about the prospects for successful policy transfer between the
Netherlands and the United States. Starting from an already structured healthcare system in which (nearly) uni-
versal access already had been realized, regulated competition is easier to accomplish than in a system that is
still in need of a universal coverage (Hacker, 2007; Helderman, 2007).
5 TK 2003 – 2004, no. 28852, Onderzoek naar de Zorguitgaven, p. 16.
6 The increase in healthcare expenses is primarily due to an increase in ‘residual’ volume and a real increase in
wages. Both of these increases can be steered through policy; however the budgetary regulations related to the
Budgetary Framework for Healthcare do not appear to provide for this (RVZ, 2008).
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